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Abstract
The article examines why some postconflict societies defer the recovery of 
those who forcibly disappeared as a result of political violence, even after 
a fully fledged democratic regime is consolidated. The prolonged silences 
in Cyprus and Spain contradict the experience of other countries such as 
Bosnia, Guatemala, and South Africa, where truth recovery for disappeared 
or missing persons was a central element of the transition to peace and 
democracy. Exhumations of mass graves containing the victims from the 
two periods of violence in Cyprus (1963–1974) and the Spanish Civil War 
(1936–1939) was delayed up until the early 2000s. Cyprus and Spain are 
well suited to explain both prolonged silences in transitional justice and the 
puzzling decision to become belated truth seekers. The article shows that 
in negotiated transitions, a subtle elite agreement links the noninstrumental 
use of the past with the imminent needs for political stability and nascent 
democratization. As time passes, selective silence becomes an entrenched 
feature of the political discourse and democratic institutions, acquiring a 
hegemonic status and prolonging the silencing of violence.
Keywords
transitional justice, Cyprus conflict, Spain, enforced disappearances, negotiated 
transitions, post-transitional justice, politics of memory 
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Although Federico García Lorca is a famous desaparecido (disappeared) of 
the Spanish Civil War, he and approximately 30,000 “forgotten” Republican 
victims are still lying in mass graves.1 Lorca’s fate epitomizes a central debate 
in contemporary Spanish society: Should the country “unearth” the truth 
about the civil war (and search for the bodies of the disappeared), or is it bet-
ter to continue to “silence” the divisive past? Spain is not the only Mediter-
ranean country dealing with the past. During the two waves of violence in 
Cyprus, namely, the intercommunal violence (1963–1974) and the subse-
quent Turkish invasion (1974), approximately 2,000 Greek–Cypriots and 
Turkish–Cypriots went missing. Disappearances were political acts deployed 
by both communities to cleanse the island of the presence of the ethnic 
“Other” in an effort to fulfill official political objectives. Until quite recently, 
there has been little effort to recover the bodies—or the truth.
Since the 1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances and the 
ensuing demand by relatives to acknowledge the truth have shaped the devel-
opment of transitional justice in societies emerging from conflict or authori-
tarianism.2 The unprecedented grassroots mobilization in several South 
American countries of the relatives of desaparecidos seeking the acknowl-
edgment of truth resulted in the first official bodies mandated to establish an 
authoritative version of human rights abuses in the mid-1980s (Neier, 1999, 
p. 40). For example, the strenuous efforts of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo in 
Argentina led to the establishment of CONADEP, a body much like a truth 
commission with specific emphasis on the desaparecidos; similar coordi-
nated efforts by relatives culminated in truth commissions in Bolivia, Chile, 
and Guatemala, to name only a few. Since then, truth commissions have 
become a central tool of transitional justice (Hayner, 2002).
Moreover, the persistent efforts of the relatives’ associations led to landmark 
legal decisions, gradually constructing an international normative context that 
reserves a central position for “truth” and enforced disappearances. The most 
significant recent development is the 2006 International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Scovazzi & Citroni, 
2007). The convention is the first universal instrument of its kind and represents 
a breakthrough; it ascribes the inalienable right of the relatives of a missing 
persons to “know the truth” (Art. 24, Par. 2)3 regarding the fate of the disap-
peared and the conditions of their disappearance. Hence, although the right to 
truth is still emerging in international law and is not explicitly stated in interna-
tional treaties (Mallinder, 2008, p. 163), the crime of enforced disappearances 
creates specific rights to truth for victims’ relatives in several treaties.
It is in this revised normative context that such concepts as transitional jus-
tice, reconciliation, and truth recovery have become central components of the 
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policy-making agenda. Note, for example, the recent decisions by international 
organizations, most important the United Nations (UN), to draw from a stan-
dard transitional justice toolbox in their peace-building initiatives (UN, 2004). 
Given this, it is not surprising that a growing number of postconflict countries 
choose human rights trials and other policies of accountability to comprehen-
sively address the violent past, leading to a “justice cascade” (Lutz & Sikkink, 
2001). Even more interesting, these normative pressures encourage societies to 
overturn prolonged silences, even several decades after transition, a phenome-
non called post-transitional justice (Aguilar, 2008; Collins, 2010).
In the midst of this burgeoning change, Cyprus and Spain pose a complex 
dilemma. Contrary to the experience of other countries with disappeared or 
missing persons, such as Bosnia, Chile, and Guatemala, where the mobiliza-
tion of (civil) society to recover the missing persons was a central element of 
the transition to democracy, Cyprus and Spain remained (selectively) silent 
for a remarkably long period after their respective democratic governments 
were consolidated and are only now unearthing bodies and truths. Of interest, 
although Latin American societies had limited access to legal and institu-
tional tools, they mobilized earlier and more effectively to address the 
demand for truth than did Spain and Cyprus, even though the latter were 
members of influential international organizations. One would expect societ-
ies with advanced legal instruments to be more proactive and effective in 
resolving human rights issues, but this was not the case.
Why do certain societies defer the acknowledgment of human rights prob-
lems even when democracy has been fully consolidated? How is this silence 
constructed, maintained, and perpetuated? How (if at all) do transitional jus-
tice settlements persist over time? Finally, what explains the recent efforts of 
a growing number of countries such as Spain and Cyprus to establish the truth 
and overturn prolonged silences, even several decades after the transition?
It is argued that an early elite consensus, frequently informed by political 
learning from past experiences, links the noninstrumental use of the past with 
the political and security priorities of the nascent regime. Ultimately, this 
leads to strong institutionalization. As time passes, a “linkage trap” is con-
structed, whereby selective silence becomes a well-entrenched and hege-
monic feature of the political discourse and democratic institutions. 
Eventually, this hegemonic linkage narrows the variety of alternative policies 
and sidelines dissenting voices. Paradoxically, this linkage frequently pro-
vides the necessary tools for domestic truth seekers to acknowledge past 
human rights abuses, albeit over the long term.
The article contributes to the growing (post)transitional justice debates by 
highlighting the importance of domestic political actors in shaping or limiting 
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external normative pressures. The decision of political elites to overturn pro-
longed silences is often informed by electoral, security, symbolic, and other 
domestic political considerations rather than driven by normative adaptation to 
external pressures. This is a gradual and often reversible process, influenced by 
the structure of domestic politics. The article also notes that the phenomenon of 
post-transitional justice is enhanced by unprecedented developments in forensic 
science. Uncontested forensic evidence legitimizes previously excluded voices, 
thereby encouraging truth-seeking initiatives to mobilize, even belatedly.
The article begins with a critical review of the literature of transitional 
justice, focusing on the absence of an analytically rigorous presentation of 
central working concepts. Drawing on the innovative tools of “elite framing,” 
it then explains the above-mentioned puzzles in Cyprus and Spain and sheds 
light on the causal mechanism through which silence over past humanitarian 
issues is constructed and perpetuated. It concludes with insights relevant to 
the study of (post)transitional justice.
Enforced Disappearances and Truth  
Recovery in Transitional Justice
Although the concept of truth recovery in transitional settings has gained 
currency over recent decades, it has been used to refer to a wide range of 
different—even contradictory—phenomena. It remains contested whether 
truth recovery constitutes a means to a higher end (i.e., reconciliation) or an 
end/value in itself. It is equally undetermined if truth refers to a process (i.e., 
truth telling) or an outcome (i.e., report of a truth commission). Nor have 
scholars determined whether the scope of truth is individual (micro truth) or 
social (macro truth).
In essence, the literature fails to address a number of ontological, epistemo-
logical, and political problems. To get around this problem, this article adopts 
a bifurcated view of truth recovery. On one hand, narrow truth recovery is 
used to refer to a minimalist conception of truth, more precisely, to forensic 
evidence related to the whereabouts of the disappeared or missing persons. 
Since the early 1990s forensic exhumations have become a conventional tool 
of international institutions in addressing the individual (narrow) demand for 
truth (Stover, Haglund, & Samuels, 2003, pp. 663-664). On the other hand, 
wider truth recovery indicates the official and unofficial efforts of societies 
emerging from conflict or authoritarian regimes to democratize the process of 
dealing with the past (Smyth, 2007) by broadening the accessibility to the 
public discourse of previously excluded voices. These range from truth com-
missions to tribunals, traditional justice, community storytelling initiatives, 
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and official apologies. Needless to say, these conceptions of truth are not con-
tradictory and frequently overlap.
Based on the Peace Accord Matrix of the Kroc Institute, Table 1 identifies 
a number of countries as truth seeking or non–truth seeking, relating this to 
the type of settlement reached—negotiated or non-negotiated. A careful 
examination of the table reveals the explanatory strengths and limitations of 
transitional justice literature. Three main groups of countries emerge from 
the table.
In the first group, shown in the bottom boxes, the absence of a comprehen-
sive peace settlement, as in the case of Eritrea-Ethiopia, can explain the deci-
sion to abstain from addressing the past. Elsewhere the total victory (or 
collapse) of one of the parties in conflict, as in the Philippines, creates condu-
cive conditions for the winning side to decide whether to address the past. 
Meanwhile, in places such as Cambodia or Timor-Leste where international 
involvement constitutes a central feature of transition/peace building initia-
tives, transition is followed by some form of (narrow or wide) official 
acknowledgment of the problem of disappearances, most significantly through 
the establishment of retributive models of accountability. The proactive 
involvement of international institutions includes the contribution of material 
resources, as well as logistic support to undertake exhumations or establish 
war crimes tribunals and truth commissions (Sriram, 2004, p. 25; UN, 2004) 
and reflects an entrenched commitment to the normative principles of 
Table 1. Type of Transition/Settlement and Truth Recovery for Disappeared or 
Missing Persons
Truth seeking Non–truth seeking
Negotiated settlement Croatia (1995–2002) Burundi (2005)
 Guatemala (1996) Indonesia (2005)
 E1 Salvador (1991) Mozambique (1992)
 South Africa (1994) Northern Ireland (1998)
 Tajikistan (1997)
Non-negotiated settlement Cambodia (1991–2003) Eritrea-Ethiopia
 Philippines (1986–1986)  
 Timor-Leste (1999–2002)  
Sources: Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute (http://peaceaccords.org), the Physical 
Integrity Rights Cingarelli and Richards Human Rights Data Set (http://ciri.binghamton.edu/), 
and the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of the U.S. State Department. 
The first date in parentheses refers to the transition or peace agreement, the second to the 
implementation of the official truth-seeking mechanism.
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transitional justice. A normative thread seems to be linking a growing number 
of scholars who insist that societies in transition that address human rights 
violations, such as enforced disappearances, are more likely to strengthen the 
rule of law, prevent recourse to self-help justice, develop respect for human 
rights culture, and educate citizenry in democratic practices (Elster, 2004; 
Méndez, 2001, p. 32; Minow, 2002). The growing use of the tool of human 
rights trials in most societies where international organizations are engaged in 
peace building bolsters the argument that the norm of accountability for grave 
human rights violations has created the “justice cascade” mentioned above 
(Lutz & Sikkink, 2001; Sikkink & Walling, 2007).
A second group, at the top left of the table, involves cases of negotiated 
transitions or peace settlements, where the transition is followed by some sort 
of acknowledgment of the problem of the disappeared.4 It seems that a signifi-
cant number of countries have opted to acknowledge human rights abuses 
despite the fragility of the peace/democratization processes. In fact, certain 
landmark cases that have shaped contemporary debates on transitional justice, 
such as Argentina and Chile, could have been included in this box. It is reveal-
ing that all societies who experienced a pacted transition and decided to come 
to terms with their past—with the exception of Croatia—chose the establish-
ment of a truth commission over measures of retributive justice. In essence, 
this column reaffirms the view of a growing number of scholars who include 
truth commissions as novel and superior tools in the transitional justice tool-
box (Hayner, 2002). Truth commissions have historically been seen as “sec-
ond-best” alternatives, located somewhere between the impossibility of 
retributive justice prohibited by the pacted nature of the transitions and the 
growing demand for truth in societies with missing persons (Neier, 1999, 
p. 40). More recently, truth commissions have been transformed; their func-
tions include the ability to restore the dignity of victims, to uproot long-
standing myths that bolster violence and cultures of victimhood (Rotberg, 
2000), and to break the cycles of violence (Minow, 2002), thereby becoming 
a central instrument of transitional justice (Brahm, 2007; Hirsch, 2007).
But that is not the whole story. One would expect that in the post-1989 
period, when the tools (including binding legal instruments, the centrality of 
human rights on the international agenda and DNA testing) were available to 
recover the (narrow or wider) truth about missing persons, more societies in 
transition would have acknowledged the truth and provided societal closure. 
But as the third group, shown at the top right of the table, reveals, more than 
half the countries that experienced a negotiated transition have resisted—for 
the time being—these external pressures. In fact, as the experiences of 
Mozambique and Northern Ireland indicate, they have primarily designed 
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policies based on amnesties and silence. A number of realist scholars sub-
scribing to the “logic of consequences” (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003) have 
long argued that because transitions and peace agreements are fragile pro-
cesses, any effort to comprehensively address the past may upset “spoilers” 
who perceive truth recovery initiatives to be blatant scapegoating and thus 
endanger the transition (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003). In essence, these schol-
ars insist that scrutinizing the past is not a normative decision but a political 
one, and, as such, any measure that could contribute to the stability and con-
solidation of the regime could legitimately be used, even if this requires the 
adoption of amnesties, impunity, forgetting, and silence (Cobban, 2006; 
Mallinder, 2008; Mendeloff, 2004).
Spain and Cyprus are outlier cases and do not fit well into the table. Spain 
would have initially been included in the top right quadrant. During the tran-
sition to democracy (1975), Spanish society and political elites decided to 
establish a “pact of silence” and literally and figuratively bury these complex 
issues. Still, in a remarkable volte-face, 70 years after the conclusion of the 
civil war and almost 30 years after the consolidation of democracy, Spain 
started digging into its past (Aguilar, 2008), moving it to the top left box. For 
its part, Cyprus is the only case where despite the absence of a political settle-
ment of the conflict, a successful mechanism has been established to address 
the demand for (narrow) truth recovery of Turkish–Cypriot and Greek–
Cypriot missing. It therefore makes sense to use these two societies to com-
prehensively test the central arguments of transitional justice literature.
With the exception of Northern Ireland, the literature of transitional justice 
has focused on “success stories” (i.e., where truth recovery is central in the 
transition) such as South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, and Guatemala 
(Thoms, James, & Paris, 2008). Little notice has been taken of cases where 
the truth recovery for missing persons and transitional justice has been absent, 
such as Cyprus and Spain. Moreover, by focusing explicitly on the period of 
transition, or immediately following it, the literature has failed to notice that 
although societies during transition may decide to defer the solution of human 
rights issues, this does not necessarily mean that a demand to acknowledge 
this will not emerge in the future.
Furthermore, the transition in Spain and the cessation of hostilities in Cyprus 
took place well before the above mentioned normative turn in the 1990s. Rather, 
they occurred at a time when foreign intervention for human rights was mini-
mal, thereby making these two countries instructive examples on how societies 
can manage humanitarian problems in the absence of the “international factor.” 
Finally, the time lag permits us to draw safer conclusions, test alternative hypoth-
eses, and examine causal patterns of silence versus nonsilence over human 
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rights abuses, than if we use more recent cases. For all these reasons, Cyprus and 
Spain are well suited to explain both prolonged silences in transitional justice 
and the decision to become belated truth seekers.
Political Learning, Negotiated  
Transitions, and Silences
In societies emerging from conflict, the guidelines for what will be remem-
bered and what will be excluded from public discourse are drawn up during 
the transitional period. Therefore, the study of transitions provides useful 
insights into the (non)solution of human rights problems and the long-term 
effects of transitions. As Figure 1 indicates, elite consensus is significantly 
facilitated—often dictated—by transitions that result from a pact between 
the major political forces. In cases of pacted transitions, there is a need to set 
a least common ideological denominator on which to build the consensus for 
the new political regime.
A decision to silence contentious incidents of the past, such as the Spanish 
Civil War, or to “selectively remember” the past in a way that accentuates a 
culture of victimhood, as in Cyprus, is frequently identified as the most 
appropriate basis for consensus in transitions to democracy. More than poli-
tics is at stake here. The burgeoning field of “memory studies” has shown that 
a common feature of posttraumatic societies is the conscious decision to for-
get certain painful aspects of the past (Brewer, 2010, p. 147; Connerton, 
2008, p. 60). In a notable case study commonly used in transitional justice 
literature, post–World War II (West) Germany’s transition in the 1950s is 
characterized by the social amnesia of Germans—forgetting what they did 
and also what was done to them (Misztal, 2005, p. 1327).
A subtle agreement is frequently reached between parties previously in con-
flict to “link” the nonuse of the bitter past to the political arena in exchange for 
a commitment to the new democratic political regime. Since negotiated transi-
tions are perceived to be second-best alternatives for all parties, contentious 
issues such as truth recovery are often excluded; public debate raises the issue 
of responsibilities and might easily become a “blame game,” endangering the 
whole agreement. For example, in Northern Ireland, the IRA remains skeptical 
of opening a formal truth recovery process on the issue of the disappeared, as 
this would raise the thorny issue of responsibilities (Guelke, 2007, p. 285). In 
this way, silence or selective memories become ingrained in political discourse. 
As noted, eventually, the elite framing becomes institutionalized and hege-
monic; this may be the most effective path to peace, stability, and democratic 
consolidation, but it decreases the prospect and scope of truth recovery.
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The process of consensus building described here is often facilitated, even 
dictated, by the painful experiences of the past which act as political lessons 
at crucial historical junctures, such as transitions.5 According to Bermeo 
(1992), “Crises often force people to re-evaluate the ideas that they have used 
as guides to action in the past. The changed ideas may relate to tactics, par-
ties, allies, enemies, or institutions” (p. 274). As Bermeo sees it, a lesson can 
be learned by considering similar experiences of other countries in the inter-
national arena (horizontal lesson) or considering a similar preceding period 
in a society’s history (vertical lesson).
Elite settlements, although providing a conducive environment for promot-
ing democracy and peace, not to mention the ideal environment for resolving 
urgent problems (economy, reconstruction, institution building), are achieved 
at the expense of the quality of the emerging democracy. Negotiated transi-
tions tend to concentrate power in the hands of a few political elites and inhibit 
open democratic procedures; they restrain the development of a vibrant civil 
society and slow the development of political and civil rights (Encarnación, 
2003; Licklider, 1995, p. 685; Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 56).
The most significant side effect of pacted transitions is the demobilization 
of civil society. Main sources of truth seeking in postconflict or postauthori-
tarian regimes are vocal civil society groups associated with the victims; in 
negotiated transitions, such as Cyprus and Spain, these remained silent. As 
noted above, in both Cyprus and Spain an early elite consensus to link the 
noninstrumental use of the past with the need for political stability led to the 
creation of a hegemonic discourse. Once a frame becomes hegemonic, incon-
venient questions that contravene or challenge it are excluded from public 
debate. As Ian Lustick (1993) says, hegemonic discourses “exclude out-
comes, options or questions from public consideration” (p. 121). This does 
not mean that frames are permanent or immutable: New legal, scientific, eco-
nomic, or political developments may force elites to slightly revise their prof-
fered frame to sustain its hegemonic role and prevent its crumbling. However, 
if the intensity and significance of the new developments outshine the ability 
of frame makers to incorporate them smoothly in the existent frame, then the 
hegemonic frame loses its explanatory value and collapses.
Method
Elite framing is a useful tool to study the policy outcomes that prevent truth 
recovery. The framing process has two analytical components. The first 
stems from the need to identify the source(s) of the problematic situation and 
attribute responsibility: This could be termed “legitimizing framing” 
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(Benford & Snow, 2000). It presumes that the present situation is unjust, and 
grievances are the result of the actions of another agent or conditions outside 
the control of the “in-group” (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). The sec-
ond, “motivational framing,” derives from the need to change the problem-
atic situation; it leads to the creation of a strategy to accomplish change 
(Benford & Snow, 2000).
Framing “select[s] some aspects of a perceived reality and make[s] them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendations” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The primary function of frames is 
to “organize experience and guide action” (Snow, Rochford, & Benford, 1986, 
p. 464); thus, a core element of the framing process is the degree of instrumen-
talization in the definition of an issue. The framing process determines “real-
ity” because of its ability to highlight certain aspects of reality while ignoring 
others (Benford & Snow, 2000). As Entman (1993) aptly notes, “The frame 
determines whether most people notice and how they understand and remem-
ber a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it” (p. 54). 
Because policy makers and ordinary people deploy these simplified mental 
images to interpret social events and choose among alternative courses of 
action (Tetlock, 1998, p. 876), framing is a useful tool for analyzing certain 
aspects of a conflict, in this case truth recovery for missing persons.6
In this article, I employ an innovative, multimethod approach to “elite 
framing” (Benford & Snow, 2000), drawing on an extensive and comprehen-
sive study of parliamentary speeches in two countries over the past three 
decades. This analysis is coupled with process tracing to identify the causal 
mechanism by which the specific elite framing adopted during transition pre-
vented the scope of truth recovery in Cyprus and Spain (George & Bennett, 
2005, p. 215). In the wide-ranging archival work that preceded the analysis, I 
read parliamentary debates, seeking to trace the construction of elite 
discourse(s). I also had limited access to classified documents from the 
Cyprus House of Representatives and memos prepared for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, I examined party docu-
ments, such as electoral programs and party memoranda. All these helped me 
to determine the development of the political discourse. The interviews I con-
ducted with politicians shed light on why certain policies were chosen over 
others at specific junctures; and my interviews with individuals with privi-
leged information allowed me to “triangulate” my hypotheses.
The study of parliamentary debates has several advantages. For one, it 
allows the analyst to pinpoint a certain framing that is adopted at a very spe-
cific time; actors cannot retrospectively change their positions to suit temporal 
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changes in context (Loizides, 2009). For another, it facilitates process tracing, 
or the construction and maintenance of elite discourse over the long term.
Spain: Disappeared and El pacto de silencio
What becomes apparent from the Spanish parliamentary debates is that the 
issue of the desaparecidos was not raised until the early 2000s.7 This pro-
longed silence poses a methodological problem in the elaboration of the elite 
framing. To overcome it, I pursue two complementary paths. First, I analyze 
the debates on other victims’ groups: those mutilated in the civil war, the 
widows and children of the fallen, and ex-prisoners. I consider the difference 
between the treatment of their demands and the silence over the issue of 
desaparecidos and relate this to elite framing. Second, I examine the debates 
on the Amnesty Law (1977), generally perceived to be the founding tenet of 
the transition. The two sets of analyses, coupled with my interviews of mem-
bers of the designated parliamentary commission and my study of electoral 
programs, overcome this methodological concern.
The debate on the Amnesty Law of 1977 is revelatory of “legitimizing 
framing.” In it, the civil war is presented as a period of “collective madness” 
where both sides committed heinous crimes. The attribution of responsibility 
is strictly avoided: Clearly, there is no “rational” actor to blame for the 
immense tragedy (Aguilar, 2002). An example of this diagnostic framing 
appears in the words of the spokesperson of the governing party, Unión de 
Centro Democrático (UCD); in a 1978 reference to the debated law on pen-
sions for widows and orphans, Bravo de Laguna Bermudez says,
[T]hose widows and orphans that today we talk about . . . are not 
merely widows or orphans of the communists, of the socialists, or 
anarchists, but widows and orphans of the tragic Spain. . . . We can 
give different explanations about what happened between 1936 and 
1939, but in any case, it was a national tragedy. (Parliamentary Debates 
No. 141, November 23, 1978, pp. 5576-5578)
He goes on to proffer strategies to alter the situation (“motivational fram-
ing”). In effect, two central framing strategies link the silence on humanitar-
ian issues with the legitimacy of the transition: the establishment of a wide 
political consensus to bury the divisive past and achieve reconciliation, seen 
as a precondition for democratic consolidation, and the adoption of an instru-
mental rationale for redressing victims groups’ (material) needs for closure.
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The element of learning from past experiences is evident in the speeches 
on the Amnesty Law and the Draft Law. The former law is framed as the 
symbolic closure of a prolonged period of divisions and the beginning of a 
new democratic era. During its debate, a representative of the Socialist Party 
insisted, “Today is the date, in which finally, the civil war is buried” 
(Parliamentary Debates No. 24, October 14, 1977, pp. 965-968). Throughout 
the parliamentary records, the need to bury the past is seen as the distilled 
experience of painful lessons, even by the representatives of the “defeated,” 
most notably communist leader Santiago Carillo (Parliamentary Debates 
No. 5, July 27, 1977, pp. 73-76). In the interviews I conducted with members 
of the Designated Parliamentary Committee for drafting the Law on Historical 
Memory in 2004, almost all still subscribed to this prognostic framing, saying 
that an agreement to bury the past was mandatory at the time (anonymous 
interviews, May 6, 2009, and May 18, 2009).
The other tenet of motivational framing highlights the instrumental ratio-
nale of accommodating the victims groups’ demands. More specifically, 
reparations are granted to certain groups not as an acknowledgment of their 
suffering or their contribution to a noble cause but to comfort the disaf-
fected, including reparations to widows and orphans (Parliamentary Debates 
No. 141, November 23, 1978, pp. 5575-5576) and military pensions (Royal 
Decree 6/1978). In part, these are acts of benevolence—not justice. They are 
perceived as solving problems not covered by the Amnesty Law; therefore, 
they are treated as solutions that will enable closure (punto final) and acceler-
ate the processes of national reconciliation and democratic consolidation 
(Aguilar, 2008, p. 420).
Still, desaparecidos are excluded from this framing. Oddly enough, at 
approximately the same time as the amnesty debates, unofficial exhumations 
were carried out in Spain. My archival research shows that from 1977 and 
throughout this first step toward democracy, exhumations took place around 
the country. In fact, a popular magazine of the time, Interviú,8 featured detailed 
coverage of the efforts of the relatives of desaparecidos to exhume the graves 
and provide their loved ones with a decent burial (Interviú, December 21, 
1978, January 3, 1980). Although in other transitional places (Latin America), 
these grassroots processes have led to strong social movements, in Spain they 
lost momentum and succumbed to the overriding hegemonic discourse.
Why was the issue of desaparecidos silenced when the demands of other 
victims groups were accommodated? I have two overlapping responses, the 
first focusing on the top echelons and the second on the grassroots, both 
related to the side effects of the specific elite framing.
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First, political exhumations (“narrow truth”) or policies of acknowledg-
ment (“wider truth”) for the desaparecidos and the political violence would 
have raised questions of political responsibility. Asking and answering the 
question “Who did what to whom?” had the potential to derail democratic 
consolidation. Therefore, any truth-seeking initiative was out of the question 
because it contradicted the raison d’être of the proffered framing, namely, to 
abstain from using the past as a political argument in debates.
A second overlapping explanation considers the meager participation of 
Spaniards in civic associations, a phenomenon described by Omar Encarnación 
(2001, p. 63) as “civic anemia.” More than 20 years after the consolidation of 
democracy, only one in three Spaniards belongs to any voluntary association, 
levels similar to the postcommunist regimes of Eastern Europe (Encarnación, 
2001, p. 63). For one thing, the legacy of the (pacted) transition led to the 
demobilization of the civil society, thereby hindering truth seeking. For 
another, an endemic feature of Spanish political culture is the penetration/
control of all sorts of civic associations by political parties, primarily through 
financial means (Encarnación, 2003). To some extent, political parties have 
determined the agenda of the associations and defined their scope. As the early 
elite framing became institutionalized and “hegemonic,” it narrowed the con-
ception of national interest at the top and silenced grassroots practices that 
could contravene it. An indication of the hegemonic status of the discourse is 
its institutionalization in legislation and legal decisions. Ryan says that in 
1979, an individual involved in an unofficial exhumation was reprimanded for 
carrying out “illegal exhumations” (Ryan, 2009, p. 123). The legal institution-
alization of this hegemonic belief is even obvious in the contemporary wave 
of exhumations. In a recent motion, Judge Baltázar Garzón argued that the 
systematic nature of the crime constitutes a crime against humanity, and there-
fore the 1977 Amnesty Law is inapplicable to cases of enforced disappear-
ances (Motion 399/2006). The possibility of overturning the founding tenet of 
the transition, namely, the Amnesty Law, sparked heated political debate and 
opened up the prospect of Garzón’s expulsion.
The case of Garzón can be fully understood only within the wider post-
transitional justice context in Spain (Aguilar, 2008). More precisely, since the 
early 2000s, several grassroots organizations of relatives have mobilized to 
unearth their desaparecido ancestors, provide them with a decent burial, clear 
their reputation, and acknowledge the corresponding (republican or demo-
cratic) version of truth about the Spanish Civil War (Ferrándiz, 2009; Gálvez-
Biesca, 2006).9 The mobilization of the generation of the grandchildren of the 
disappeared exerted bottom-up pressure on the socialist government, leading 
to the passage of the above-mentioned Law on Historical Memory, which 
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addressed central issues of transitional justice: denouncing Franco’s regime, 
banning public symbols that commemorate Franco or his allies, mandating 
local governments to finance exhumations of mass graves, declaring “illegiti-
mate” the summary military trials held during the civil war and Francoist 
dictatorship, opening up military archives, and offering other measures of 
moral, symbolic, and economic repair to all victims of the war (Law 53/2007).
In other words, more than three decades after the consolidation of democ-
racy in Spain, a specific framing was ingrained in political institutions, the 
political system and legislation. Simply stated, its hegemonic status pre-
vented truth recovery. It is surprising, however, that the prolonged silence 
was finally broken. Proof of this is the passage of the Law on Historical 
Memory and its fuelling of media and public debates.
Cyprus: Selective Memory and Missing Frames
Tracing the elite framing of the problem in the Republic of Cyprus over the 
past decades reveals a number of downplayed or silenced issues. Take, for 
example, the official definition of the missing. Until 2003, a missing person 
was considered to be a “Greek–Cypriot who is still missing since the July 
20th 1974, due to the Turkish invasion . . . and the state has no positive infor-
mation that s/he died” (Law Number 77/1979). Two interesting features of 
motivational framing are evident in this definition. First, the beginning of the 
problem of missing persons coincides with the Turkish invasion (July 20, 
1974), thereby indicating a conscious decision to causally link the issue of 
the missing with the invasion. Since 1974, 12 resolutions by the House of 
Representatives have assigned sole responsibility to Turkey; all were 
adopted unanimously (Resolutions 37/1975, N.46/1978, N.58/1980, 
N.113/1992, N.124/1997). Second, the Turkish–Cypriots who went missing 
as a result of the atrocities of Greek–Cypriot paramilitaries in the 1960s 
(Patrick, 1976) are excluded, even though they are citizens of the republic.
In other words, selective memory (or selective oblivion) became a found-
ing tenet of the pact that facilitated the transition to peace and democracy in 
the Republic of Cyprus after the 1974 invasion. References to cases of miss-
ing persons, either Greek–Cypriots or Turkish–Cypriots preceding the 
Turkish invasion, would have seriously delegitimized the predominant dis-
course that identifies the Turkish invasion as the cause of the problem.
Motivational framing can explain the tactics of political elites in the 
addressing of the problem of the missing. They used two overlapping framing 
strategies: one emphasizing national unity and reconciliation by strengthen-
ing the institutions of the republic as the only way to overcome the legacy of 
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intracommunal division of the past within the Greek–Cypriot community and 
restore credibility to the Republic of Cyprus; the other using the symbol of 
wounds opened by the Turkish invasion to accentuate a “culture of victim-
hood” and enable the construction of a new common basis of “unity” for the 
Greek–Cypriot community.
Although the Turkish invasion is used as the focal point of the framing, it 
was preceded by growing intracommunal violence within the Greek–Cypriot 
community culminating in a short coup ousting President Makarios.10 
Leftists, frequently treated as traitors, were the targets of violent attacks dur-
ing the anticolonial struggle of EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων 
Αγωνιστών—National Organization of Cypriot Fighters);11 these peaked dur-
ing the coup (Papadakis, 1993). A number of civil society initiatives repre-
senting the relatives of those killed have recently emerged demanding that the 
state apologize for the human rights violations of leftists (Ireton & Kovras, in 
press). The legacy of intracommunal violence was so traumatic that it contin-
ues to create political cleavages within the Greek–Cypriot community. 
Nevertheless, in the overall “Cyprus problem,” even left-wing parties who 
suffered from nationalist violence have subscribed to the frame prioritizing 
“national unity.” For example, on the first anniversary of the coup, when the 
memories of the intracommunal violence were still fresh, the leader of the 
communist party AKEL officially declared that his party would “keep the flag 
of patriotic unity high” (Parliamentary Debates July 15, 1975, p. 581). The 
Cypriot Communist party echoed PCE’s conciliatory tone in Spain, mention-
ing the need for concessions (“silences”) to pave the way for democracy.
The Turkish invasion led to a revised framing, one focusing on unity and 
the traumas of the invasion. The missing became the central symbol of ongo-
ing suffering, and political elites invested political capital in this framing. The 
official name of the designated parliamentary committee on missing persons 
(established in 1981), the Committee on Refugees-Enclaved-Missing and 
Adversely Affected Persons (discussed in greater detail below), underscores 
this political strategy. By linking all aspects of victimhood triggered by the 
Turkish invasion, it was expected to frame the problem in human rights terms, 
thereby enhancing international sympathy for the Greek–Cypriot negotiating 
position in the search for a political settlement to reunify the island.
As might be expected, the elite framing, in combination with the (de facto) 
division of the island in Cyprus facilitated the creation of a “highly censori-
ous environment,” one “marked by taboos, intolerance and vilification of 
views deviating from the predominant governmental discourse and the offi-
cial views of history” (Faustman, 2009, p. 34). As in Spain, this culture has 
fettered the development of a vibrant and vocal civil society (Mavratsas, 
2003), which, as noted above, is a source of truth seeking. Even the official 
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organization of the relatives of the missing has interpreted human rights 
through the lens of national interests. In other countries with disappeared or 
missing persons, such organizations are the main sources of truth seeking; but 
in the Greek–Cypriot community, they blocked truth recovery (Kovras & 
Loizides, 2011). For example, in the mid-1990s, the relatives’ association 
objected to the government’s intention to exhume common graves in two 
Greek–Cypriot cemeteries on the grounds that this would lead to a “cover-
up” of the problem (Kovras & Loizides, 2011; Sant Cassia, 2005).
Despite the absence of a political settlement, in 2004 a bicommunal agree-
ment was reached to resume the activities of the hitherto ineffective 
Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). “De-linking” humanitarian issues 
such as the missing—where the Republic of Cyprus had a moral advantage—
was previously considered likely to weaken the overarching Greek–Cypriot 
political strategy for the reunification of the island. However, lessons learned 
from past policy failures by chief policy makers, technological advancements 
that supported a revised policy, and the domestication of new (legal and 
human rights) norms all contributed to the resumption of the CMP.12 It has 
now become the most successful bicommunal project on the island 
(UNFICYP, 2007). By August 2010, 690 bodies had been exhumed and 248 
identified (CMP, 2010).
In addition, although the elite framing retained its founding tenets, it became 
less rigid and began to acknowledge the victimization of Turkish–Cypriots. 
Paradoxically, a dual framing process has facilitated the exhumations and the 
demand for (narrow) truth recovery. On one hand, although the wave of exhu-
mations is seen to reaffirm the dominant discourse of victimhood—that is, 
every exhumation is an evidence of the Turkish aggression—there is strong 
incentive to encourage the effective working of the CMP. At the same time, the 
slightly revised framing that encompasses the Turkish–Cypriot missing has led 
to institutional measures that introduce the (relatives of the) Turkish–Cypriot 
missing as legitimate political actors. This development has transformed the 
normative context within which domestic actors interact, leading to the support 
of the CMP even by actors or politicians who previously had reservations. 
Despite the remaining political stalemate, the developments on the missing 
have instilled in the public and political discourse critical reevaluation over 
responsibilities for the past—an element previously “missing.”
Lessons for (Post)transitional Justice
The study finds that an early elite consensus and its institutionalized dis-
course is a double-edged sword in negotiated transitions. On one hand, the 
deep institutionalization of the consensus excludes dissenting voices and 
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prevents early truth recovery. On the other hand, it may be a necessary evil 
to achieve a minimum level of democratic consolidation and peace. Labeling 
this a “linkage trap,” I note that in negotiated transitions, a subtle elite agree-
ment links the noninstrumental use of the past with the imminent needs for 
political stability and nascent democratization. Gradually, this silence is 
ingrained in the political institutions and the political culture; ultimately, this 
framing acquires a hegemonic status that is hard to challenge. But in the long 
term, this silence may be a necessary precondition for democratic consolida-
tion. Alternatively put, there is an inherent paradox in consensual institu-
tions: They are oriented toward reproducing the consensus (hegemonic 
belief), which silences the victims and civil society at large, but at the same 
time they cultivate democratic institutions that provide the tools necessary 
for domestic truth seekers (such as civil society groups) to promote truth 
recovery and (post)transitional justice, albeit in the long term.
Given this logic of consequences, political parties representing or affili-
ated with victims’ groups frequently hesitate to deal with the past, even if 
they assume power in the nascent democratic regime. The cases of PSOE and 
AKEL, in Spain and Cyprus, respectively, are not exceptional. The consecu-
tive socialist governments (1981–1989 and 1993–2004) in Greece, while rep-
resenting a significant number of those defeated in the Greek Civil War, have 
abstained from addressing the past. The same applies to Chile. In the after-
math of the 1989 referendum that ousted Pinochet, the center-left Concertación 
coalition governed for four terms but made only marginal moves toward offi-
cial acknowledgment of the past (Sandbu, 2010). Political parties represent-
ing the defeated or past victims may prefer to disappoint their electoral 
constituents rather than trigger instability and endanger overarching objec-
tives (e.g., democratic consolidation, economic development, or reconstruc-
tion of state infrastructures).
However, this is just one part of the story since at different post-transition 
periods, these same parties may decide to break the silence and campaign in 
the interests of victims groups. For example, during his presidency in 
Argentina (2003–2007), Néstor Kirchner introduced measures calling for 
greater scrutiny of the past, most notably by declaring the “full-stop” and 
“due obedience” laws as null and void, as well as reopening trials for human 
rights abuses—including disappearances (“A Full Stop Removed,” 2003). 
Similarly, in Uruguay, despite two referendums that rejected the annulment 
of the amnesties for human rights abuses during the military from 1973 to 
1985, President Vázquez campaigned to abolish the amnesty law, arguing 
that it violated Uruguay’s obligations under international human rights trea-
ties (“Human Rights in Uruguay,” 2010).
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Hence, silence is not an irreversible feature of national politics and collec-
tive memories. In fact, there is a growing trend in posttraumatic societies to 
revise the pacts of silence, even after a considerable delay, which reflects the 
broader normative turn in international politics. In the period preceding the 
end of the cold war the overarching priorities of maintaining global order and 
stability made amnesties and silence over human rights abuses constitutive 
elements of peace agreements (Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009). Since 
then, though, the global diffusion of human rights norms (Risse & Sikkink, 
1999) has increasingly dictated the inclusion of human rights provisions into 
peace settlements. As Christine Bell’s (2008, p. 243) systematic study of 
more than 600 peace agreements since 1990 has shown, the emerging norma-
tive consensus perceives amnesties as an exception to the norm of account-
ability. New normative requirements on the content of peace settlements are 
explained by the proactive role of the most influential international institu-
tions in combination with the emergence of vocal transnational advocacy net-
works which exert pressure for their implementation. In essence, these 
external normative pressures have rendered blanket amnesties obsolete, 
changing the nature and the content of elite bargaining in peace processes and 
democratic transitions (Lutz & Sikkink, 2001). The growing deployment of 
normative tools to address the past in peace agreements is also evident by the 
decision of an increasing number of countries undergoing negotiated transi-
tions to deal with their violent past, a phenomenon reflected in increased 
number of truth commissions (Hirsch, 2007).
This revised normative framework not only informs the content of pact 
making but also, as the experience of several South American societies has 
indicated, legitimizes domestic truth seeking actors to exert bottom-up pres-
sure in a way that overturns enduring amnesty laws and challenges decades-
long silences (Collins, 2010). In other words, the agenda of international 
politics (and law) has considerably changed since the historical examples of 
Cyprus and Spain. The new norms prevent silence from being institutional-
ized and bring an end to oblivion and denial in societies with well-entrenched 
cultures of silence. In the period preceding the normative turn of 1990s, it 
would have been unimaginable for any Spanish government to pass a law that 
would address several (post)transitional justice measures or challenge the 
legitimacy of the Amnesty Law of 1977—perceived as the founding tenet of 
the post-Francoist Spanish democracy.
The landmark memory law in Spain should not be attributed exclusively 
to external influences. It also resulted from the sustained efforts of a number 
of grassroots groups who had been trying since the early 2000s to unearth the 
bodies of the desaparecidos of the civil war. These efforts were ultimately 
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embraced by influential domestic allies, including political parties, judicial 
authorities and media, and resulted in officially implemented measures of 
(post)transitional justice (Ferrándiz, 2009). Similarly in Cyprus, the resump-
tion of the CMP was preceded by the strenuous efforts of bureaucrats within 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who perceived the external influences as an 
opportunity to implement a policy of (narrow) truth recovery. However, this 
policy has not led (yet) to the crumbling of the hegemonic silence—only its 
substantial revision.
The experiences of Cyprus and Spain reveal that the role of domestic 
actors is crucial in taking advantage of (or resisting) external influences; even 
when a decision to overturn silence is made, this is not a linear or predeter-
mined process, but gradual progress with many pauses and backward steps. 
Brazil verifies this; 25 years after the end of the dictatorship, the proposal of 
the popular President Lula to establish a truth commission on the disappeared 
triggered a fierce reaction from the military and was subsequently withdrawn 
(“Don’t Look Back,” 2010). This is a central feature of other post-transitional 
justice societies, such as Chile and El Salvador (Collins, 2010).
External opportunities depend on domestic politics and vice versa. This 
point echoes Putnam’s (1988, p. 430) “two-level game” theory: international 
pressure “expands domestic win-sets,” and as such constitutes a necessary 
condition for a policy shift, but “without domestic resonance” this is insuffi-
cient. The decision of political elites to revise a well-entrenched framing is 
often shaped by electoral, security, symbolic, and other political consider-
ations, rather than explained exclusively by normative adaptation. Drawing 
on the same theoretical framework, Martin and Sikkink (1993) have high-
lighted the importance of domestic constituencies in filtering external pres-
sures in several Latin American countries. Although the study acknowledges 
the power of external normative pressures in bringing about post-transitional 
justice and the erosion of prolonged silences, it also highlights the pivotal 
role of domestic politics in utilizing or resisting these normative influences, a 
point frequently disregarded by the prescriptive orientation of the literature. 
Most important, the study fits in with a broader trend toward bridging the gap 
between the international and comparative politics (Caporaso, 1997); it 
shows how international norms have come to revise the nature of pact mak-
ing, while highlighting the importance of domestic actors and institutions.
Another issue raised by the comparative analysis of Cyprus and Spain 
relates to the nature of truth in transitional settings. Even the most celebrated 
venues for screening the past, such as truth commissions or trials, analyze or 
incorporate individual “truths” through a kaleidoscopic view of the past that 
seeks to establish a new mental framework to make sense of complex and 
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confusing past events (Wilson, 2003, p. 370). Frequently, the mandates of 
truth commissions delimit the scope of enquiry, either by focusing exclu-
sively on the study of specific human rights violations or by considering a 
very specific period of violence (Chapman & Ball, 2001, p. 4). For example, 
some transitional states have mandated truth-finding mechanisms to investi-
gate only disappearances, excluding other crimes, such as torture, arbitrary 
detention or sexual abuses of women, as the cases of Argentina and Uruguay 
reveal (Chapman & Ball, 2001, p. 4). In this way, truth-seeking initiatives 
contribute to a narrative construction that privileges certain memories, vic-
tims’ groups, or political parties at the expense of others. Trials and truth 
commissions frequently exclude, obscure, or marginalize other accounts that 
contravene this overarching framework. Therefore, it is important to high-
light that although truth seekers challenge hegemony, they also construct a 
new one, and this new hegemony may be full of blind spots.
In Cyprus and Spain, the advancement of forensic sciences has made an 
important contribution to truth discovery. On one hand, forensic evidence 
establishes hard facts about the past violence that legitimizes previously 
excluded voices. On the other hand, forensic evidence from exhumations cre-
ates more (discursive) space for multiple—but equally legitimate—truths to 
enter public debates. The ability to unearth the (narrow) truth about the past 
in a scientifically sound way paved the way for the acknowledgment of the 
suffering of the Turkish–Cypriot missing. Forensic truth coupled with the 
global normative context encourages the emergence of multiple versions of 
truth about the past. This enhances the prospects of (narrow or wider) truth 
recovery in postconflict settings and suggests the need for overturning pro-
longed silences.
Conclusion
In negotiated transitions, a subtle elite agreement linking the noninstrumen-
tal use of the past with the political and security priorities of the transitional 
society is often achieved. As time passes, a “linkage trap” is constructed, 
where selective silence over the past becomes a well-entrenched feature of 
the political discourse and democratic institutions. As soon as this framing 
becomes hegemonic, dissenting voices are silenced; it also narrows the con-
ception of national interest and inhibits the solution of human rights issues, 
even when new windows of opportunity open. At first glance, we conclude 
that this situation leads to a deadlock. However, as the hypothesis of “linkage 
paradox” shows, in the long term, the linkage of (i.e., the silence on) human 
rights issues to the elite pact that serves as the founding tenet of transition 
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becomes the most efficient way to unearth the truth. More precisely, this 
silence enables the consolidation of strong democratic institutions, which, in 
turn, provide the institutional tools to (domestic) truth seekers to put forward 
a comprehensive truth recovery, when such a societal demand emerges.
A policy of reviewing the past cannot be implemented without societal 
consensus that this is a priority. The fascinating transformation of an inopera-
tive humanitarian body for more than two decades into the most successful 
bicommunal project in Cyprus and the vocal demand of the generation of the 
grandchildren of the desaparecidos in Spain to unearth the remains of their 
grandparents 70 years after the conclusion of the civil war reflect the emer-
gence of a new societal consensus. In both countries, domestic actors chal-
lenged the long-standing hegemonic silence, reaffirming the growing 
phenomenon of post-transitional justice in international politics and reflect-
ing the new normative turn seen round the globe.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Neo Loizides, Adrian Guelke, Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, Kathleen 
Ireton, Katia Andronikidou, Evan Liaras, and Elizabeth Thompson for their com-
ments on previous drafts of this article. I would also like to thank the Comparative 
Political Studies editorial team, especially Professor James Caporaso and the two 
anonymous reviewers, for their insightful feedback.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, 
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.
Notes
 1. The estimated number of remains still lying in unmarked mass graves ranges 
from 30,000 to 100,000 (Ferrándiz, 2009).
 2. This has been defined as “the array of processes designed to address systematic 
or widespread human rights violations committed during periods of state repres-
sion or armed conflict, where human rights violations are defined as extrajudicial 
killings, disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest and imprisonment” (Olsen, 
Payne, & Reiter, 2010, p. 805).
 3. “Each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the 
enforced disappearance, the progress and the results of the investigation and the 
fate of the disappeared person.”
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 4. Assisted by the International Commission on Missing Persons, Croatia has estab-
lished a mechanism to exhume, identify, and return the disappeared to their rela-
tives.
 5. Peter Hall provides an interesting definition of learning: “a deliberate attempt to 
adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new 
information. Learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a 
process” (Hall, 1993, p. 278).
 6. It should be mentioned that framing is not an epiphenomenon. It is not merely 
a reflection of reality, but a simplification of a “perceived reality” (Loizides, 
2009). In essence, framing is the deliberate effort of different social actors to 
produce, guide, and maintain meaning, and, as such, it is important to examine 
how specific political problems are framed (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613). By 
examining the framing strategies of different actors, we can establish cause-and-
effect relationships.
 7. This includes research on the parliamentary debates, questions, and laws related 
to the issue of desaparecidos in the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados (lower 
house), interviews with members of the designated interministerial commission 
that prepared the law on the Recovery of Historical Memory in 2007, and analy-
sis of the electoral programs of the major nationwide political parties since the 
first democratic elections after transition in 1977.
 Although there are scattered references in the 1970s and 1980s, there are only 
marginal provisions for the reparations of relatives.
 8. I am grateful to Professor Santos Juliá for bringing this source of information to 
my attention.
 9. Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory.
10. July 15, 1974.
11. The most important Cypriot anticolonial armed group active in the 1955–1959 
period.
12. The ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the fourth Interstate appli-
cation of Cyprus v. Turkey (27581/94), May 10, 2001, constituted a landmark 
decision that influenced the policies of both Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus.
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